9 Aralık 2007 Pazar

:: Uzay mekiği Atlantis'in fırlatılışı 2 Ocak 2008'e ertelendi...


STS-122 görevi kapsamındaki, Atlantis Uzay mekiğinin fırlatılışı 2 Ocak 2008'e ertelendiği duyuruldu...

Ertelenme sebebi, aracın dört motorundan birinin yakıt kesme sensöründeki (ECO) problem olarak açıklandı...

Bu sensör sistemlerinin birkaçının çalışmaması durumunda yakıt akışının kesilebileceği açıklandı.

Kaynak : NASA

:: Büyük Güneş Lekesi 978...


Fotoğraf, "Rogerio Marcon" tarafından Sao Paulo/Brezilya'dan çekilmiş...

978 Lekesinin kapladığı alanın büyüklüğü Dünya'nın 5 katı...

Kaynak : Spaceweather

978 lekesi, gümeşin dönüşü ile birlikte12 Aralık günü dünya doğrultusuna gelecek.

Leke B-sınıfı parlamalar veriyor ve 48 saat içerisinde C-sınıfı parlama verebilecek yapıda.

:: Nedir bu VOR? (VHF Omni-directional Radio Range)


Yönü belirtmek için yerden yayınlanan sinyallerin faz karşılaştırmasını yapan bir hava seyrüsefer telsiz yardımcı cihazıdır ve aviyonik sistemler kategorisindedir. Bu terim "Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Radio Range" çok yüksek frekanslı tüm yönlere açık telsiz menzili kelimelerinin baş harflerinden oluşmuştur.108 - 118 MHz bant aralığında, 100 kHz'lik kanal adımları ile çalışır. Yer istasyonu 30 devir/saniyelik bir elektromanyetik örüntü yayar. bu sinyal hava aracındaki VOR alıcısında 30 Hz'lik bir sinüzoidal dalga üretir.

Yer istasyonu aynı zamanda uzaya tüm yönlerde 30 Hz'lik bir referans işareti üzerine FM modüleli bir sinyal yayını yapar. Sözü edilen iki 30 Hz'lik sinyal arasındaki faz farkı hava aracının yer istasyonuna göre açısını verir.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VHF_omnidirectional_range

Peki VOR sinyali karıştırılabilir mi?

Her elektromanyetik dalgada olduğu gibi, evet.

Örneğin bir Amerikan senatörünün uçak kazasında ölmesinin sebeplerinden birinin VOR ve ILS sinyallerinin jammer ile karıştırılmasından olabileceği yönde görüşler var.

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John Ongaro, a Minnesota lobbyist, wrote to Fetzer about his experience the day Wellstone died. Ongaro said he was driving to the same funeral that Wellstone and his party were flying to in Eveleth, Minn. While traveling north on Hwy. 53 near the Eveleth-Virginia Municipal Airport in the same area as Wellstone's plane, he received a call on his cell phone at precisely the same time Wellstone's King Air veered off course.

"This call was in a league of its own," Ongaro said. "When I answered it, what I heard sounded like a cross between a roar and a loud humming noise. The noise seemed to be oscillating, and I could not make out any words being spoken. Instead, just this loud, grotesque, sometimes screeching and humming noise."

What he heard may very well have been electronic interference from an EMP or microwave weapon.

One writer to talk show host Jeff Rense suggested a scenario involving "black op specialists" in a van or truck full of radio/instrument landing jamming equipment. "As Wellstone's plane approaches the airport, the VOR/ILS jamming equipment is activated, and a 'decoy' VOR signal is sent to the plane, thus tricking the plane's instruments [and the pilot] into believing the airport is somewhere several degrees off the true course to the runway," S.H. wrote. "The pilot follows that signal straight into the ground. The non-descript van, full of covert electronic jamming equipment, casually leaves the area, looking just like any other TV repair truck or moving van."

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Burayı tıklayarak Amerikan senatörü hakkındaki arama sonuçlarına erişebilirsiniz.

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Pekala aviyonik sistemlerin kullandığı elektromanyetik sinyaller gerçekten karışabilir yada karıştırılabilir mi?

Aşağıda bunun ile ilgili bir makale mevcut,

Makalede bir ispanyol radyosunun ve sanayi tesisinin sinyali nasıl karıştırdığı tespit edilmiş.

(Aşağıdaki örnekte VOR frekans aralığını içermesede tesbiti için iyi bir örnek teşkil ediyor.)Occurrences of jamming in the Civil Aviation VHF band

The equipped Be-90 was put into operational service in October 2002. The first searches were immediately fruitful and showed the importance of this means in the fight against frequency jamming. SCTA played a central role in the action plan that was set up: it is the empowering body that decides to start a search. When the information on the jamming is sufficient, this is transmitted to STNA, which organizes a search flight as quickly as possible, depending of course on the availability of the aircraft and crew (in-flight controller from STNA and pilots from SEFA). When all these elements are available the operation can take place very quickly, and in certain critical cases the search flight takes place just three hours after it has been triggered by SCTA. Every effort is made so that the operation takes place within 24 hours of the jamming being reported to STNA.
STNA Operations are in charge of filing the flight plan that is established as far as possible to pass through the area where the jamming is perceived. Depending on the results, this flight plan is of course adjusted in real time with air traffic control. ATC is warned in advance by Operations staff concerning the specific natu
re of the flight and the planned course of operations. STNA also asks that the disturbed frequency be liberated during the search in order to avoid misleading direction-finder readings on legitimate transmissions from an aircraft or air traffic control. This requirement does not usually create any problems, but can sometimes necessitate sector groupings, which, in some cases, can lead to regulations being laid down In order to reduce the impact that the search flight can have on air traffic, the preliminary information is essential since it allows the area of operation to be well defined.
Once the flight arrives in the area, the aircraft follows the filed flight plan until a first signal is detec
ted, which is always on the EB-200 as it is more sensitive than the direction finder. If it is possible to obtain readings and if the listening quality is not good enough to identify the jamming with certainty, the operator then instructs the flight crew to look for a first switchover, therefore a first "abeam station". It is during this approach that care must be taken to correctly interpret the direction-finder information, which can sometimes be rather erratic according to the nature of the jamming signal and/or the electromagnetic environment in the area. This first pass usually occurs at cruising level (between flight levels 170 and 240 usually). After that, in order to be as certain as possible regarding the position of the source and to give pertinent information to the ground team (Regional Technical Service or National Frequency Agency ANFr) who will finalise the search, one or more low passes are necessary. This is done depending on the terrain, the safety altitude in the sector and the weather conditions. When these elements are favourable, it is sometimes possible to identify visually the origin of the jamming.
When a vertical pass is difficult or impossible, because of fluctuating bearings for example, software is used to calculate a position by triangulation from the various measurements recorded (direction finder-readings, GPS position and EB-200 field levels). The final search on the ground is then made from the latitude/longitude coordinates obtained.
Since 1998, the operations using STNA aircraft were able to resolve 70 cases of jamming that
were either reported or simply observed during systematic search campaigns. The origin of 91% of the cases treated was an FM radio broadcasting service in the 88-108MHz band, and 34% of the cases were of foreign origin. Among these 70 cases, some of them required an operation using the Be-90. The following examples explain some of the most symptomatic jamming.
Spectra of jamming at ACC/Southwest sector N

ACC/Southwest: Sector N
This case is one of the most critical ones that occurred in 2003. UIR sector N is operated b
y Area Control Centre (ACC) Southwest and covers an area extending from the south of Toulouse as far as the Spanish border where the traffic is then under control of the Madrid ACC. This sector channels a large quantity of north/south traffic; closing the sector and grouping the frequency with the adjacent sectors means that many regulations need to be laid down.
This is what happened on several occasions during the year 2003 due to an audible disturbance on frequency 135.205MHz described by crews as background noise or humming. As is often the case, the controllers did not perceive this jamming. In addition, this phenomenon seemed to appear at random at any time of the day. This case needed two operations using the Be-90. The first search took place on 9 April 2003 and was not successful due to the limits imposed by the dedicated permit to fly issued before the final airworthiness certificate was obtained after the modifications made to the aircraft. In fact, this first search showed that the source of the disturbance was located in Spain. It was not possible to perform a vertical search as the permit to fly limited the aircraft's manœuvres to French territory. Nevertheless, the specific character of this jamming could be shown: for once, the jamming was not caused by an FM radio, but by a parasite signal moving randomly on a band of 2MHz. This particularity explained the temporary aspect described by the pilots who had been confronted with this phenomenon.
On 30 July 2003, the second search, made this time with a normal airworthiness certificate, enabled the source to be located northwest of Gerona (Spain). The search was quite delicate, however, due to the mobility of this signal, which necessitated many frequency changes on the EB-200 and direction finder to continue the measurement, which in addition, was quite disturbed due to the mountainous environment of the site. These conditions prevented a good vertical pass over the site being made in spite of many attempts at different altitudes and from different angles of approach. The data recorded was nevertheless sufficient to calculate a reliable and precise triangulation of the jamming. This position was confirmed later (within a range of 600m) by a team on the ground. The origin of this disturbance turned out to be an electrical drying system used by a manufacturer of conductor cables.
It is noteworthy that although the operation enabled the source to be identified, it also caused some delays, as sector N had to be closed during the whole duration of the search.

Trajectories of jamming search flights on 135.205MHz. (The colour of the dots depends on the level received).

Nîmes, Muret, Calvi aerodromes: TWR frequencies
This case could have had more serious consequences if the jamming had lasted. It had been
reported by three aerodromes using the same TWR frequency, 123.20MHz. The complaints mentioned a permanent background noise above a certain altitude, which varied depending on the place where the jamming

Muret, Nîmes and Calvi TWR frequency jamming

was perceived. The probable area where the source of jamming was located was quite easy to determine because of the geographical distance separating the three aerodromes. The search flight plan was therefore defined in a triangle: Toulouse, Montpellier and Perpignan. As expected, the jamming was picked up quickly after taking off from Toulouse Blagnac and was immediately tracked by the direction finder. The first abeam station pass took place at FL170, then two vertical passes at 6000ft and 3000ft enabled visual identification of the source located at a military airfield close to Narbonne. As shown by the spectra recorded during this search (see Figure 11) it was a continuous wave emitted by some military VHF equipment, on which the push-to-talk automatic test system had remained stuck on transmission.

ACC/West: 127.86MHz

Search flight trajectory on 123.20MHz

A search to solve this case took place in August 2003 after complaints from ACC/West reported severe disturbances on 127.86MHz. As some crews had reported hearing music, it was fairly sure that the source would turn out to be an FM radio. This hypothesis, together with the experience of jamming affecting the ACC/West's sectors of south Brittany/Bay of Biscay, led to a flight plan being filed to pass over Biarritz and continue to Bilbao (BLV VOR). Indeed, just beyond Pau, the jamming was easily identified. The signal and its spectra confirmed that the phenomenon was in fact due to a fault in a Spanish FM station. The search continued until an excellent vertical pass was made, which enabled the site of the transmitting pylon to be located very precisely.

Spectra of jamming from a Spanish radio on an ACC/West frequency

Clermont Ferrand aerodrome: Approach frequency
This example is typical of operations carried out the most frequently with the BE-90. This assignment took place on 23 October 2003 and enabled identification of an FM radio beaming signals

Search trajectory on 127.86MHz

on 128.83MHz, a Clermont Ferrand approach frequency. The complaints at the origin of this search reported crackling and background noise on the approach frequency in the whole of the West/Northwest sector of its area of use. The initial flight plan was designed to cover this fairly large area. Very soon after take-off, the disturbing signal was identified and easily tracked thanks Site of emission

to the co-operation of Clermont Ferrand air traffic control, which had liberated the frequency. A vertical pass was made at very low altitude, which allowed a visit by the ANFr the very next day. It turned out to be a transmitter of the "Vallée de Vézère" radio station in Dordogne, emitting 1kW on 104.40MHz. This radio could not be identified during the search, as the parasite signal more closely resembled a continuous wave than an FM modulation. Apparently the fault originated in a frequency synthesizer generating parasite rays with very little FM modulation.

Search on Clermont Ferrand APP frequency

ACC/Southwest LG Sector
This last case illustrates the added value of the Be-90/MDF-124F system. During the month of May 2004, ACC/Southwest had been subject to many disturbances on band 135.96MHz. The pilots had described these phenomena as noises like a "machine gun", which seemed to indicate that for

Jamming on ACC/Southwest's frequency sector LG

once the troublemaker was not an FM radio, but rather a parasite coming from a factory or some kind of electrical equipment. The first operations planned by SCTA were unfruitful since the phenomenon had disappeared before the aircraft took off. It was only upon the third attempt that the signal could be followed as far as the vertical over the Chinon nuclear power plant. This jamming, the cause of which has still not been identified at the present time, would have been difficult to locate without the capabilities of the direction finder. Furthermore, with a longer operation time, the aircraft could not have been airborne during the periods when the ACC/Southwest was disturbed due to the random occurrence of the phenomenon over a period of time.


The site emitting the disturbance

8 Aralık 2007 Cumartesi

:: Atlantis uzay aracının yeni fırlatılma tarihi...


Yeni fırlatılış, Yarın Türkiye saati ile 22:21'de...

Kaynak : NASA

:: Büyük Güneş Lekesi...


Güneş lekesi 978, hızla büyüyerek yılın en büyük lekelerinden birisi haline geldi...

Fotoğraf "Pete Lawrance" tarafından Selsey/İngiltereden , "Coronado Kalsiyım-K PST" filitresi kullanılarak çekilmiş...

Kaynak : Spaceweather

:: GPS Sinyalleri karıştırılabilir mi? Yolcu uçakları etkilenebilir mi?

Evet! GPS Sinyalleri kesinlikle karıştırılabilir ancak yolcu uçaklarının etkilendiğini söylemek ne kadar doğru olur?!

Aşağıdaki görülen Rus yapımı GPS jammer ile GLONASS Uydularından veri alan alıcılar yanıltılabiliyor.

Teknik karakteristikleri;

Operasyon menzili: 150-250 km
Çıkış gücü: 4W
Anten kazanç faktörü: 3-5
Ağırlığı: 8-10kg
Güç tüketimi : 25W
Elektriksel gereksinimler: +15V 1.5; -6 1.5A


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Aşağıda ev yapımı bir GPS jammer'ın tehlikesi, computerworld'de yayınlanmış.

Air Force Lt. Col. Ken. McClellan, a Pentagon spokesman, said the implications of homemade jammers described in the article are "somewhat serious" because the use of such jammers "could disrupt commercial operations."
McClellan said GPS experts at the Pentagon do not "at the moment" view homemade jammers as a hazard to flight safety for commercial aircraft or ship operations, "but rather a nuisance."
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is developing a nationwide GPS-based precision landing system. (Evet Amerika genelinde geliştiriliyor) And the Coast Guard operates a GPS-based maritime navigation system on both coasts, the Great Lakes, inland waterways and Hawaii. Bill Mosley, a spokesman for the Department of Transportation, the parent agency of the FAA and the Coast Guard, said his department is well aware of the threat posed by GPS jammers.
The DOT's John A.

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Evet ev yapımı rahatsız ediyor! Fakat askeri amaçlar için profesyonel olarak üretilenler neler yapabilir!

Karıştırmak bir tarafa interferans ile (düzenli yapıcı ve yıkıcı girişimler ile) yönlendirme yapmak bile mümkün olabilir... (Uçaklar için doppler ve konum kaymaları gibi faktörler ile uğraşmamak için bu tarz aygıtlar kargoda taşınabilir! Yani hareket kaynağı ile...)

Ancak şuan için GPS jammer ile bir yolcu uçağını düşürmek yeterli görülmüyor.

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Aşağıdaki karıştırıcı ise, araca bağlanabilen bir GPS Jammer, bu jammer Hollandalı DetectNu firması tarafından üretiliyor...

Araç aracın olası GPS sistemleri ile takip edilmesini engellemek amaçlı tasarlanmış... (Paranoyaklar için karıştırıcı :)

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Güvenilir kaynaklardan biri olan space.com sitesinde yayınlanan aşağıdaki haberi incelediğimizde;

http://www.space.com/news/gps_iraq_030325.html
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WASHINGTON -- U.S.-led coalition forces have destroyed six devices being used by Iraqis to try to jam signals from the GPS satellite navigation and weapon-guidance system, a U.S. senior military officer said.

Speaking to reporters during a March 25 briefing in Qatar, U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Victor Renuart, director of operations at U.S. Central Command, said that in one instance, the jamming device was destroyed with a GPS-guided bomb.

Another Pentagon official, speaking March 24, said Iraqi attempts to jam GPS using devices allegedly supplied by a Russian company have not succeeded.


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Bir GPS- Jammer ile GPS güdümlü bomba yok edilebilir.


Aşağıda ise "Scientific Research Corporation" firmasının askeri amaçlar için ürettiği jammer...

Görüldüğü gibi elektronik harp metotları arasına giriyor.


http://www.scires.com/products/sti/tss5.htm

ELECTIVE GPS JAMMER

The Global Positioning System (GPS) Jammer Test Instrumentation (GPS JTI) facilitates exploration of open-air GPS jamming test methods via the ability to selectively jam targeted GPS dependant systems while not affecting untargeted GPS receivers. The GPS JTI jammer will support exercises and scenarios that involve numerous electronic warfare experiment approaches against GPS dependant systems. Due to the achieved performance, the GPS JTI will be used for evaluating the requirements of future GPS jamming test instrumentation to be developed and will also be used for demonstrating the techniques and technologies available for such exercises. SRC provides engineering, test and management support for the development, integration, and test of the GPS JTI.

The GPS JTI accommodates the necessary instantaneous dynamic range of 100 dB while maintaining flexibility through digital attenuator and synthesizer controls and replaceable electronically programmable read only memory units. A control signal transmitter extends the programmable and reconfigurable approaches to the transmitting test asset.

SRC developed flexibility into the hardware architecture through programmable and modular techniques. To ensure that the analog hardware preserved the dynamic range requirements of the simulation community, modeling and simulation of the automatic gain control circuitry was performed and was verified at system acceptance test. Also, the noise characteristics of the radio frequency front end was modeled in conjunction with AGC noise power spectral density inputs for resolving ultimate dynamic range predictions and forming specifications for the noise performance of the RF front end.

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GLS (GPS/GLOSNASS Landing System uçakların inişlerinde kullanılmaktadır.

Aşağıda continental havayollarına ait MD-83'ün 1998 yılında ilk kez GLS kullandığı haberi yer alıyor,

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Steve Nichols

Honeywell will claim a world first later this month when a Continental Airlines MD-83 flight becomes the first revenue service to land using a GPS landing system (GLS).

On 21 September, the aircraft will fly two approaches into New York Newark and Minneapolis-St Paul using the SLS system developed by Honeywell and Pelorus Navigation.

The SLS-2000 is the only GLS to have received FAA acceptance for its ground-based system and Honeywell has received orders from several airports in the USA and abroad.

Announcing the flight at Farnborough, Mark Howes, vice-president of Honeywell Airport Systems, says: "This flight will be the culmination of a very big year for our Satellite Landing System.

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Ancak her MD-83'de GLS sistemi olduğuna dair bir makale mevcut değil...


ABD'de Yolcu uçaklarının inişlerinde, WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) adında gelişmiş bir sistem bu yıldan itibaren kullanılmaya başlanmış. Bu sistemde GPS bir doğrulama aracı olarak kullanmakta...


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Ancak en açıklayıcı makale "Amerikan Navigasyon Merkezinden" gelmekte...

Bu makale ile GPS Jamming'in Nasıl engelleneceği ile ilgili bilgi bulunmakta! Dikkat nasıl engelleneceği! FAA'in'de araştırmada bulunması ilginç. Sadece o da değil DoD ve diğer agency'ler...

Overview of the US Federal Government's Policy on Activities Which May Cause Interference to GPS:

On occasion, the US Federal Government is required to conduct GPS interference tests, exercises and training activities that involve jamming of GPS receivers. These events go through a lengthy coordination process involving the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the US Coast Guard (USCG), the Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agencies. (CIA gibi :)

Due to the fact that these training and testing activities can involve a number of aircraft, ships and/or other military equipment and up to hundreds of personnel, cancellation or postponement of a coordinated test should only occur under compelling circumstances. In general, only safety-of-life/safety-of-flight conflicts warrant cancellation or postponement of a coordinated interference test.

In the event that an interference activity compromises a safety-of-life mission, procedures exist to protect those involved. If a Lifeguard (medical evacuation flight), fire-fighting mission, or other aviation-related activity where GPS navigation is essential is impacted the conflict should be reported to the nearest FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) facility. FAA will issue ”cease buzzer” (stop jamming) notification to the tester. All testers are required to set up a point of contact reachable via telephone throughout the testing period.

Non-aviation related safety-of-life activities that require immediate cessation of GPS interference tests should be reported to the USCG Navigation Center (NAVCEN). The NAVCEN will either issue the “cease buzzer” or relay it to the FAA for issuance.

In the event that a safety-of-life conflict is anticipated, but not immediate, the affected GPS user should notify the USCG NAVCEN. An example of this is firefighting activities that may spread to testing areas. In some instances, the USCG may choose to put the tester directly in contact with the affected GPS user. In other cases, the USCG may choose to notify the appropriate government official to resolve the conflict.

When attempting to resolve such a conflict, the interests of both parties must be taken into account.

Conflict resolution considerations:

  • What is the safety issue involved?
  • Is there an alternative, non-GPS method to perform the activity?
  • What are the implications to National Security if the test, training or exercise is terminated or postponed?
  • For both parties, what is the purpose of the activity?
  • For both parties, how many individuals or systems are affected?
  • For both parties, what are the economic implications?
  • Is it possible for either party to reschedule to another date or set of dates?
  • Is it possible for either party to only use a portion of the dates they require?
  • Is it possible for either party to use different or fewer times of day than in the original request?
The answers to these questions will provide guidance to the decision makers who will resolve the issue.

Test parametreleri için burayı tıklayınız.

http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/gps/gpsnotices/default.htm

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FAA'in soru ve cevaplarından;

How vulnerable are GPS satellites to jamming and interference?

GPS satellite signals, like any other navigation signals, are subject to some form of interference. The FAA is actively working with the U.S. Department of Defense and other U.S. Government Agencies to detect and mitigate these effects and make sure that the GPS and any related augmentation systems are available for safe aviation operations. As with all navigation aids, interference, whether intentional or unintentional, is always a concern. A number of methods for minimizing interference have been identified and tested and others are being investigated. The FAA is also working to make sure augmentation systems detect and mitigate these effects.

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7 Aralık 2007 Cuma

:: Antimatter Leaving Eden...



Put the thorn in my side, the coins on my eyes
I'm not awake, I'm leaving Eden
And all her frozen charms lie cold in my arms
Panic went away and left me reeling
It's warm outside but the weather fails to hide
the stinging loss inside
For in the back of my mind I always thought I'd find my way to paradise
On I'd walk to paradise ...

But grace and lies locked the door from the other side
And now there's not much else there
Grace and lies
In all how long can you hide, how long?

The cost of innocence is the loss of innocence
Some may pass away, but some die screaming
When it came to my time, oh it took me by surprise
Was it my mistake, or am I born for giving in?